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Physician's Liability for Torts of Hospital Employees
Irene E. Svete*
"I will prescribe regimen for the good of my patients according to
my ability and my judgment, and never do harm to anyone .. .
If I keep this oath faithfully, may I enjoy my life and practice
my art, respected by all men in all times; but if I swerve from
it, or violate it, may the reverse be my lot." Oath of Hippocrates,
S HOULD A TREATING PHYSICIAN be held liable for negligence of hospital
employees? A Federal District Court 2 recently held the treating
physician, an obstetrician-gynecologist, liable for the negligence of the
hospital employees when his patient died following childbirth. The
Court held that such employees were under the control of the doctor
and that he was vicariously liable for their actions. 3 The decedent had
been a patient of the doctor for obstetric care, remaining under his
sole and exclusive care during her pregnancy, delivery and post partum
period until her death three days after delivery.4
Although the defendant-physician delivered her baby, the episi-
otomy repairs were performed by the resident. On the day following
delivery, the patient complained of severe abdominal pains, and on
written order of a resident, she was given tranquilizers through
that day and the next. Her condition worsened and the defendant
was so informed by telephone calls from her husband and from the
resident physician. However, he did not at any time order any diag-
nostic procedures, stating on the telephone as his opinion that she was
having post partum cramps, as magnified by a low pain threshold. At
no time did the specialist visit the patient until her condition became
critical in the evening of the third day. At that time he was informed,
when he telephoned the hospital, that she was in deep shock. He
ordered the resident and intern to use an intravenous infusion of
glucose and water with a vasopresser drug. He finally saw the patient
for the first time after delivery when he came to her room about 1: 15
A.M. and learned that the intravenous was unsuccessful. He made a
physical examination and then ordered only such therapeutic measures
as consisted of administration of oxygen, application of heat and eleva-
tion of the feet. At 3:30 A.M. the patient was declared dead. An
* B.S., Ohio University; Legal Secretary; Third-year student at Cleveland-Marshall
Law School.
I Wasmuth, Law for the Physician (1966) at 18.
2 Schuler v. Berger, 275 F. Supp. 120 (D.C. E.D. Penna., 1967).
3 Ibid. at 124-125.
4 Id.
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autopsy disclosed a diverticulitis of the sigmoid colon with an acute
rupture of the diverticulum resulting in peritonitis and death.
5
This malpractice action against the physician was brought by the
administrator of the decedent's estate and the jury found for the
plaintiff with an award of $60,000.00. The jury had been instructed
that such symptoms as noted above are obscure, and that negligence
could not be found based on negligence to diagnose. Plaintiff claimed
that the physician was negligent in failing to take necessary steps to
detect and treat patient's peritonitis, in other words, to use the skill
and care of his profession. The defendant claimed that plaintiff failed
to show proximate cause, because the latter's witness had not testified
that death came from cause alleged.
On appeal, however, the court found that plaintiff's expert witness
did testify as to his belief that had certain therapeutic measures been
taken, the patient would have survived.6 Citing with approval Hicks v.
United States, the court said that proximate cause is tested and proved
if "master's omission destroys the reasonable possibility of rescue." 7
The Court, in denying motion for a new trial, found that the
defendant was in control of the patient all through her pregnancy,
delivery and postpartum period and had not discharged her; he dele-
gated responsibility for her care to others and was thus liable for their
actions. He and the employees had not performed blood work, or
taken therapeutic measures to care for her.
8
Why should a treating physician be held liable for any lack of
treatment on the part of the hospital employees? On what basis can
such a conclusion be reached? In the Schuler case, the right to control,
not direct supervision, was the standard used in this vicarious liability.9
An agency relationship was considered as existing between the
parties, making the physician liable for the actions of the hospital
employees. He was the "Captain of the Ship," the one in control of
the patient's treatment and care. Only he was answerable for resulting
injury and death from lack of said treatment. The "Captain" will be
held liable for others' negligence where the acts performed by them
are under conditions where the physician could have or should have
been able to prevent injurious effects and did not.10
A "Physician" has been defined as one proficient in the art of
healing disease, preserving health and alleviating or remedying physical
5 Id. at 122.
6 Id. at 123.
7 368 F.2d 626, 632 (4th Cir., 1966). "If there was any substantial possibility of sur-
vival and defendant has destroyed it, he is answerable."
8 Supra, note 2 at 125.
9 Ibid; Yorston v. Pennell, 397 Pa. 28, 153 A.2d 255, 85 A.L.R. 872 (1959).
10 70 C.J.S., Physicians and Surgeons § 54, at 979.
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defects.1 He is expected to exercise a certain standard of care towards
his patients, based on the ordinary care, skill, and knowledge of the
profession.12 The right to practice medicine is a constitutional right,
but also a conditional one.13 Physicians have always been required
to conform to such a reasonable standard of training as the state legis-
lature may prescribe 14 "having in mind the public health and wel-
fare." 15 Standards for Ohio are set forth in the Revised Code, as
well as statutes found in the Codes of other States.16 Such legislative
enactments impose a specific duty for the protection of the public. 17
The physician undertakes in his treatment of the patient, by con-
tract express or implied, to hold forth that he possesses ordinary skill
and knowledge of his profession and that he will "use ordinary care
and diligence in the exercise of same" to accomplish the purpose for
which he was employed, that of treating the patient.'8 His original
and continuing obligation is to his patient. However, the contract
element in this relationship is less of a factor than the matter of negli-
gence-the omission of due care or use of skill. Common law has held
him responsible for injury to the patient proximately resulting from
this, or for failure to use his best judgment in manner of treatment.19
For many years, physicians were held to a community or locality
standard, with an early enunciation in Small v. Howard, an 1880
Massachusetts case. 20 Modern thinking has broadened this, so far as
most Courts are concerned, to take into consideration "the advances of
the profession"; the "locality" rule has no present day vitality except
11 42 Ohio Jur. 2d, Physicians and Surgeons, at 521.
12 Beach v. Chollet, 31 Ohio App. 8, 166 N.E. 145 (1928), wherein the standard was
said to be the "present state of medical scientfic knowledge at time of treatment";
Swan's Treatises, Fundamentals of Ohio Jurisprudence (1884, Rev. 1935) at 641.
13 41 Am. Jur., Physician and Surgeon, at 135.
14 Ohio Rev. Code §§ 4731.34, 4731.41.
15 State v. Garnett, 65 Ohio St. 289, 62 N.E. 325 (1901).
16 Ibid.
17 Taylor v. Webster, 12 Ohio St. 2d 53, 231 N.E. 2d 870 (1967).
18 42 Ohio Jur. 2d § 111, at 629. Bowers v. Santee, 99 Ohio St. 361, 124 N.E. 238
(1919), the "... . relationship arises out of contract, express or implied."
19 Shuman v. Drayton, 14 Ohio C.C. 328, 80 Ohio C.D. 12 (1897). Note, 12 Vand.
L. R. 595 (1959); and see, Oleck, Damages to Persons and Property (1961 rev. ed.) at
Secs. 192, 409C, that-when a plaintiff uses reasonable care in obtaining treatment
or care of his injury, aggravation of such injury by improper treatment by the phy-
sician is a reasonably possible consequence of the original wrong and makes the
defendant liable for the entire injury, including the aggravated aspects of it.
20 Small v. Howard, 128 Mass. 131 (1880), "undertaking of physician as implied by
law is that he possess and will use the reasonable degree of learning, skill and
experience which is ordinarily possessed by others of his profession in the com-
munity where he practices, having regard to the current state of advance of his
profession . . . and that he will in cases of doubt use his best judgment as to the
treatment to be given in order to produce a good result. He does not warrant a
cure."
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as one of the elements to determine the degree of care and skill re-
quired as a standard.2 1
Brune v. Belinkofi 22 was a malpractice action against an anesthe-
siology specialist for alleged negligence in administering a spinal
anesthetic, with injury resulting to the patient from an excessive
dosage of pontocaine. Medical evidence showed that such dosage
was customary in the city where defendant practiced his profession.
The issue raised by the plaintiff was whether the defendant was to
be judged by the standard of doctors residing in the community. The
Court expressed the opinion, in holding the specialist liable, that
Small v. Howard is "unsuited to present day conditions" and such hold-
ing should be overruled. A standard must be used by which considera-
tion is given to the advances of the profession-and consider medical
resources available to him as one of the circumstances in determining
skill and care required in treatment of patient.
23
The Courts are thus extending this duty of physicians and requir-
ing a still higher standard for specialists who are held to a special
degree of skill and knowledge possessed by doctors who devote par-
ticular attention and study to treatment. It is, of course, based on
a consideration of public policy to protect the health and lives of the
people. The physician has an obligation based on his contract with the
patient to render a service, that of treatment.
Although a physician may not be held liable for an error of judgment,
he is required to use his best judgment in the exercise of such skill
and application of his knowledge, and prescribing what he thinks is
best "after careful examination." 24
Four elements appear in a malpractice action: first, the existence
of a relationship between the doctor and patient; second, the duty of
the doctor to prevent injury to his patient; third, failure of doctor to
21 Brune v. Belinkoff, 235 N.E.2d 793 (Sup. Jud. Ct., Mass. 1968); Tracy, The Doctor
as a Witness (1957) at 145; Knisely, Modern Medico-Legal Trends, 25 Ohio St. L. J.
362 (1964); Pederson v. Dumouschel, 72 Wash. 73, 431 P. 2d 973 (1967) at 978,
"... reversible error to instruct jury that standard of (conduct) care in medical
malpractice suit is the learning, skill, care and diligence ordinarily possessed in
practice by others of same profession in good standing, engaged in like practice in
the same locality, or a similar locality . . .has no present day vitality except as one
of the elements to determine degree of care of skill." Gaheen v. Graber, 181 Kan.
107, 309 P. 2d 636 (1957). Carbone v. Warburton, 11 N.J. 418, 94 A. 2d 680 (1953) at
683 ". . . opinion of expert witness must be directed to degree of knowledge and
skill, which is usual in the grade of the profession which defendant occupies and
in which defendant is employed in the particular case." Douglas v. Bussabarger, 438
P. 2d 829 (Wash. 1968) ". . . small town doctors not entitled to different standard
than similar doctors in other areas." Hundley v. Martinez, 158 S.E. 2d 159 (W. Va.
App. 1967).
22 235 N.E. 2d 793 (Mass., 1968).
23 Ibid.
24 Pike v. Hunsinger, 155 N.Y. 20, 49 N.E. 760 (1898). Baggett v. Ashland Oil Co.,
236 N.E. 2d 243 (Ohio 1968). ". . . should be held only to such a standard of care
as recognizes foreseeable risk of injury."
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prevent such injury; and fourth, resultant injury i.e., a causal relation-
ship between injury and failure to perform duty.2 5
The burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish that liability;
unless gross negligence is found as a matter of law, expert medical
testimony will be required. 26
Negligent malpractice includes those cases where there is no
criminal or dishonest act-but negligence of that attention which the
situation of the patient requires and "is bad or unskillful practice in
a physician . . . whereby the health of the patient is injured." 27
A jury hearing a malpractice action, particularly if composed in
part of women, would be prone to apply the high standard in the
physician's care of the patient. It is reasonable and logical to expect
the obstetrician to check personally and frequently on his patient, to
observe first hand her postpartum symptoms. After-birth depression is
common, but more pronounced in some women than in others. For a
doctor to treat and counsel the patient all through her pregnancy and
then not to see her for two days following delivery would certainly
raise doubts in jurors' minds, as they listen to the evidence, whether
he was fulfilling his obligations to his patient. If he has the requisite
skill to be an obstetrician, he certainly has the insight and judgment
to determine the feasibility of looking in on the patient to analyze
whether her pains are psychosomatic or physically induced, because
of some complication in her condition. He can not delegate his duty
to another without incurring liability for their actions. The hospital
employees in Ohio are not permitted to administer any therapeutic
measures without being prescribed by the physician in charge.28
He has a further obligation to be in attendance during the period
of hospitalization, so long as he has not discharged his patient. Too
many doctors have a completely depersonalized view of their patients-
so busy that they neglect to check on those under their care-not
taking the time to personally treat them. When the facts of the case
show that the physician is aware of the patient's condition and he
ignores the symptoms, the court finds that there is liability.2 9
25 Tracy, op. cit. supra note 21; Regan, Doctor and Patient and the Law (3rd ed.
1956) at 29-30; Wasmuth, op. cit. supra note 1.
26 Riggs v. Christie, 342 Mass. 402, 173 N.E. 2d 610 (1961). "Court or jury" should
not retrospectively substitute its judgment for that of the person whose judgment
has been sought and given until expert testimony or evidence from profession con-
cerned is given." Scardina v. Colletti, 63 Ill. App. 481, 211 N.E. 2d 762, 765 (1965).
27 Bouvier's Law Dictionary.
28 Ohio Rev. Code § 4723.06 (Eff. 1-1-68) as to nurses; § 4731.291 (Eft. 12-1-67) as to
residents and internes. Kinkela, Hospital Nurses and Tort Liability, 18 Clev-Mar.
L. R. 58 (1969).
29 Louisell and Williams, Trial of Medical Malpractice Cases, § 8.05, at 148. "Com-
plaints, observations and remonstrances of patient must be heeded to a reasonable
(Continued on next page)
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The physician has no less of a duty to call on his patient because
the latter is receiving care in a reputable hospital and being seen by
other doctors. 30 It is his right, of course, to determine by his own
judgment, the frequency of his visits. But when there is cause to
believe that personal attention, supervision and additional treatment
are necessary, then lack of diligence in doing so, constitutes failure to
exercise the skill and care of his profession. He has a duty to use
and make available all diagnostic aids throughout the period of re-
covery.3 1
So we have two important elements of medical practice, the knowl-
edge of basic techniques and the ability to use good judgment in fitting
the whole picture of treatment into place.
3 2
When the physician does not personally supervise his patient, the
intern, resident and nurses are his agents and are acting in behalf of
the doctor. But this duty, it has been held, can not be delegated with-
out recourse.3 3 The act of the agent is deemed the act of the principal,
and the latter "incurs the obligations which are the proper results of
the acts of the agent done within the scope of his authority." 34
This doctrine of responsibility seems to turn on whether the al-
leged acts of negligence were "under the immediate supervision and
control of the physician" when done by the hospital employees. The
assistant is said to be subject to immediate control and supervision
when the treating physician is the one who makes all the necessary
arrangements with the hospital, business and medical, in regard to
the patient.35
(Continued from preceding page)
extent." Note, 12 Vand. L. R. 535 (1959) "... if keeping in touch by phone-must
listen to complaints." Morgan v. Sheppard, 188 N.E. 2d 808, 816, 817 (Ohio 1963).
"Usual and customary methods generally employed by physician and surgeon and
the diagnosis, care and treatment of a patient, no matter how long such methods
have continued to be employed, cannot avail to prove and establish as safe in law
methods and conduct which are in fact negligent."
30 Prosser, Law of Torts (3rd ed. 1964), at 218. "There must be reasonable evidence
of negligence . . . But where the thing is shown to be under the management of the
defendant or his servants, and accident is such as in the ordinary course of things
does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords
reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant that the arci-
dent arose from want of care." Moeller v. Hauser, 54 N.W. 2d 639 (Minn. 1952).
31 Supra note 7; Nicola, Medical Malpractice, 25 Ohio St. L. J. 387 (1964); Bowers v.
Santee, supra note 18. Gillette v. Tucker, 67 Ohio St. 106, 65 N.E. 865, 869 (1902).
32 Wasmuth, op. cit. supra note 1. Pike v. Hunsinger, supra note 24.
33 Ault v. Hall, 119 Ohio St. 422, 164 N.E. 518, 60 A.L.R. 128, 12 A.L.R. 3rd 1019n
(1928).
34 Frazier v. Hurd, 6 Mich. App. 317, 149 N.W. 2d 226 (1967), rev'd on other grounds
380 Mich. 291, 157 N.W. 2d 249 (1968); Swan, op. cit. supra note 12, at 334.
35 Ault v. Hall, supra note 33. Graham v. St. Luke Hospital, 46 Ill. App. 2d 147, 196
N.E. 2d 355 (1964); St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Company v. St. Joseph Hospital,
212 Minn. 558, 4 N.W. 2d 637 (1942); Aderhold v. Bishop, 94 Okla. 203, 221 P. 752, 60
A.L.R. 137 (1923); Lawyers Med. Cyc. § 2.58, at 164 (curr. ed.); Ybarra v. Spangard,
25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P. 2d 687, 162 A.L.R. 1258 (1944).
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During an operation the services of such employees may be loaned
for a period of time to the surgeon and as such, he becomes the master
and is liable for their actions while he personally supervises and has
control over them.3 6 The Courts have gone on to consider the in-
capacity of the patient at this time and the complete dependence on
the physician during the operation and also the post operative period.
The doctor is charged with the duty to see that "no preventable injury
results," 31 and such responsibility continues until the relationship be-
tween doctor and patient will be terminated.3 s If the physician no
longer is going to treat his patient, he should give notice of such termi-
nation. 39 Therefore, so long as this relationship does exist, he retains
the "Captain of the Ship" position and prescribes the treatment and
therapeutic measures to be administered by the hospital employees.
Thus arises the continued principal-agent position throughout the post
operative period.40
There can be no absolute liability for negligence, for a doctor can-
not be an insurer of his acts; but a breach of his duty to act can be the
proximate cause of injury to the patient. He must be attentive to the
patient's needs and be diligent in diagnosing and treating the same.
As to the amount of time and attention devoted to the patient per-
sonally, much would depend on circumstances, type of injury, custom
and practice, all of which are taken in consideration by the Courts.
Since he may be liable on principles of agency or master-servant, he
must use utmost care in supervision and instruction of the assistants.
Interns do not hold themselves out to practice medicine, nor do they
have patients of their own, their chief and primary reward, it has been
said, is instruction received from hospital staff physicians when as-
sisting and watching. They, as well as nurses and residents, are limited
in their duties.4 1 It would be unreasonable to expect the same skill
and knowledge from the hospital employees as from the treating
physicians. The hospitals are not in the business of treating patients,
their function being the care of those admitted to the institution by
the doctor in charge of the patient.
36 35 Am. Jur. Master and Servant § 3, at 445. Restatement of Agency § 226.
37 Aderhold v. Bishop, supra note 35.
38 Stewart v. Manassas, 244 Pa. 221, 90 A. 574 (1914).
39 Ricks v. Bridge, 91 Utah 307, 64 P. 2d 208 (1937); Capps v. Volk, 189 Kan. 287,
369 P. 2d 238 (1962); Gillette v. Tucker, supra note 31.
40 Ibid; Swan, op. cit. supra note 12.
41 Rush v. Akron General Hospital, 84 Ohio L. Abs. 392, 171 N.E.2d 378 (1958). Ohio
Rev. Code § 4731.29.1 (5), (Eff. 12-1-67) "... practice only under supervision of at-
tending medical staff of such hospital . Ohio Rev. Code § 4723.06 (Eff. 1-1-68)
practice of professional nursing defined, "acts of medical diagnosis or prescription
of medical, therapeutic or corrective medical measures by a nurse are prohibited."
May, 1969
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A landmark case in this regard is one familiar to all law school
students. Ybarra v. Spangarl4 2 is a California case in which the plain-
tiff had surgery with several nurses and doctors in attendance. While
on the operating table, he was placed in such a position as to be
resting against two hard objects below his neck. Following the opera-
tion, he had severe neck and shoulder pains, but was told that it was
paralysis of traumatic origin. There was a decision for the plaintiff based
on the theory that there was a special responsibility on the part of
every one for his safety. Every defendant who had anything to do
with his care was bound to exercise ordinary care to see that no un-
necessary harm came to him and each would be liable for failure in
this regard. The doctor in charge of the operation would be liable for
any negligence of those who became his temporary servants for the
purpose of assisting in the operation.
An oft-cited case is Aderhold v. Bishop,43 using the respondeat
superior theory. Here the head nurse scalded the feet of the patient
while in the operating room, and again the power of the surgeon to
control the situation was used as the basis of liability.
44
There is, of course, conflict in this matter as in every facet of the
law. In every state, Pennsylvania, 4 5 Oklahoma, 46 Wyoming,
47 Massa-
chusetts, 48 Tennessee,49 and Ohio,50 where physicians were not held
liable in court actions of this type, the decisions seem to be based on
lack of supervision or control.
On the other hand, Pennsylvania 1 has been a state where several
cases have found liability along with Ohio
5 2 on the control theory.
42 Supra note 35.
43 Supra note 35.
44 Ibid.; Honeywell v. Rogers, 251 F. Supp. 841 (D.C. Pa., 1966).
45 Shull v. Schwartz, 364 Pa. 554, 73 A. 2d 402 (1950); Honeywell v. Rogers, supra
note 44 ".... liability is imposed only when physician is in control and when not a
surgery or post-operative matter . . . but is merely administrative and routine."
46 Clary v. Christensen, 54 Ohio L. Abs. 254, 83 N.E. 2d 644 (1948) surgeon had no
responsibility to direct activities in re preparation of operating room.
47 Wright v. Conway, 34 Wyo. 1, 241 P. 369, 242 P. 1107 (1925).
48 Baker v. Wentworth, 155 Mass. 338, 29 N.E. 589 (1892).
49 Meadows v. Patterson, 21 Tenn. App. 283, 109 S.W. 2d 417 (1937) physician can-
not be liable unless it appears that he had continued control.
50 Oberlin v. Friedman, 5 Ohio St. 2d 1, 213 N.E. 2d 168 (1965) administration by
anesthetist held to be the responsibility of the hospital; Klema v. St. Elizabeth Hos-
pital, 170 Ohio St. 519, 166 N.E. 2d 765 (1960).
51 Mazur v. Lipshulz, 360 A. 2d 275 (3d Cir. Pa., 1966); McConnell v. Williams, 361
Pa. 355, 65 A. 2d 243 (1949).
52 Ault v. Hall, supra note 33; Shannon v. Joller, 6 Ohio App. 2d 206, 217 N.E. 2d
234 (1966); Morgan v. Sheppard, supra note 29.
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Courts of England,,3 Missouri,5 4 Oklahoma, 5  Idaho,56  Louisiana,57
Minnesota,58 District of Columbia,5 9 Michigan, 60  Kansas, 6 1 Tennes-
see, 2 Illinois,63 Vermont,64 and CaliforniaS have all held the treating
physician liable.
In analyzing the decisions reached in the various jurisdictions, we
can see that in determining the matter of liability, the Courts have
prominently brought into play this "Captain of the Ship" doctrine and
used it as a guiding principle. When the Courts have found him not
liable, they have held, "no control." 60
Some early cases denied relief to the plaintiff where there was no
reasonable anticipation of injury and the nurses were under the super-
vision of the hospital.67
However, a 1909 English caseos followed the rule of vicarious li-
ability, where the hospital had been found to have exercised care in
selection of its agents, and not liable for their negligence, such agents
being under the orders of the operating surgeon. The same result was
reached in a 1911 Ohio case. 9
Courts have held that such employees can be servants of two
masters at one time,70 and when lent to a second master, he becomes
liable for their actions. When having been lent, the principal is silent
as to the acts of his agents, he is ratifying such act and is liable. 71
53 Hillyer v. Governor of St. Bartholomew Hospital, 2 K.B. 820 (1909).
54 Longan v. Williams, 79 S.W. 655 (Mo. 1904).
55 Aderhold v. Bishop, supra note 35.
56 Davis v. Potter et al., 2 P. 2d 318 (Idaho 1931).
57 Messina v. Societe Francaise de Bienfaissance, 170 S. 801 (La. App. 1936).
58 St. Paul v. St. Jos. Hospital, supra note 35.
59 Hohenthal v. Smith, 72 App. D. C. 345, 114 F. 2d 494 (1940).
60 Winchester v. Meade, 372 Mich. 593, 127 N.W. 2d 337 (1964). Frazier v. Hurd,
supra note 34, physician held liable for negligence of doctor assisting him, the latter
becoming the agent of the former, according to the Court.
61 Voss v. Bridwell, 188 Kans. 643, 364 P. 2d 955 (1961). Capps v. Volk, supra note 39.
62 Harrison v. Wilkerson, 405 S.W. 2d 649 (Tenn. 1966).
63 Lundahl v. Rockford Memorial Hospital, 235 N.E. 2d 671 (Ill. 1968) court held
that treatment is responsibility of physician, and hospital not liable.
64 Minoque v. Rutland Hospital, 119 Vt. 336, 125 A. 2d 796 (1956) hospital not liable
because physician was held to be the one with right to control; the employees were
temporary servants of the doctor in charge.
65 Ybarra v. Spangard, supra note 35.
66 Supra note 48.
67 Supra notes 38, 47.
68 Supra note 53.
69 Taylor v. Protestant Hospital Association, 85 Ohio St. 90, 96 N.E. 1089 (1911).
70 McConnell v. Williams, supra note 51.
71 Manufacturers Casualty Insurance Co. v. Martin Libreton Insurance Co., 242 F. 2d
951 (5th Cir., 1957).
May, 1969
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However, in Harlan v. Bryant,7 2 where a nurse administered drops to
a new born infant's eyes, causing damage, the Court held that he had
not ordered such treatment, and the nurse had acted of her own voli-
tion, and the physician was not liable. In the Hohenthal v. Smith7 3 case,
however, where an intern gave an injection and the needle broke off
in the patient, the physician who ordered the injection was liable,
as the intern was "performing the duty of the hospital to the patient
when carrying out the instructions of the physician." When the phy-
sician's orders to the hospital employees were incomplete and injury
to the patient resulted, the doctor was liable.74 In Capps v. Volk 7 5
when defendant physician attended patient throughout post operative
care, his implied contract continued, carrying continuing liability for
injury, which resulted when an intern was negligent in removing a
drain tube from the incision. The physician's duty was held to ex-
tend to this aftercare. Shannon v. Joller70 required of the physician
an explanation of the resultant injury, he being the one in control.
Sponges left in incisions are common occurrences and the courts
hold surgeons accountable on principle of respondeat superior.7 7 Even
when the surgeon leaves the operating room, he may be held liable
for the actions of the attendants.7 8 When a technician administered
the wrong type of blood, his negligence was attributed to the surgeon,
79
the treatment of the patient being the responsibility of the physician. 0
With thi4 particular type of case, the Courts continue to hold that
the hospital cannot be liable since they cannot practice medicine and
these borrowed servants are the responsibility of the treating phy-
sician. 8 '
As we consider the development of this theory of liability, it be-
comes apparent that it is not new. There may be some trend toward
abandoning the "Captain of the Ship" doctrine because of the fall of
hospital "charitable immunity," 82 but it is not reflected in the cases
72 87 F. 2d 170 (7th Cir., 1936).
73 72 App. D. C. 345, 114 F. 2d 494 (1940).
74 Winchester v. Meade, supra note 60.
75 189 Kan. 287, 369 P. 2d 238 (1962).
76 6 Ohio App. 2d 206, 217 N.E. 2d 234 (1966).
77 Supra note 62.
78 Harrison v. Wilkerson, supra note 62.
79 Mazur v. Lipshulz, supra note 51.
80 Supra note 63.
81 Note, 12 Vand. L. R. 598 (1959); op. cit. supra note 29. St. Paul Mercury Indem-
nity Co. v. St. Joseph Hospital, supra note 35; Aderhold v. Bishop, supra note 35;
Minoque v. Rutland Hospital, supra note 64.
82 Avellone v. St. John Hospital, 165 Ohio St. 467, 135 N.E. 2d 410 (1956); Klema v.
St. Elizabeth Hospital, 170 Ohio St. 519, 166 N. E. 2d 765 (1960).
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discussed here. The "enterprise theory" or "deep pocket" theory in
re the physician 8 still seems to have impact.
Other than to suggest that the possibility that malpractice actions
are certain to proliferate, it is impossible to hazard a guess as to
whether this trend of holding the treating physician liable for the torts
of the hospital employees will continue. The medical practitioners
must make fewer mistakes, take a more personal view of their pa-
tients, and restrict their case loads to provide more individual atten-
tion, and maintain a high degree of care, skill and knowledge.
The public cannot at the present time rely on the legislature to
discipline the medical profession for its flagrant mistakes, and a mal-
practice suit is the only alternative for a person who has been in-
jured, because of medical negligence. The physician must not be
allowed to shift the responsibility for his tortious acts of omission or
commission to the hospital employees.
8 4
83 Capps v. Volk, supTa note 39.
84 Averbach and Belli, II Tort and Medical Yearbook (1962) at 392.
11Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1969
